Competition can both aid and hinder reputational commitments for quality.
Introduction
This note presents an example highlighting that competition can have a non-monotonic e¤ect on the ability of a …rm or an industry to sustain an equilibrium in which it produces high quality products. Moreover, inasmuch as we provide parameter examples in which high quality can be sustained in markets where the degree of competition is either very low or very high, but not where it is intermediate, the intuitions we provide might be of use in considering the di¢ culty of the transition to competitive markets In general, whether reputational considerations will motivate a …rm to perform some costly action, say producing high quality, depends on the trade-o¤ between the short-term gain or saving in not performing the action and the long-term e¤ects of beginning the following period with a relatively low reputation (say that the expectation will be that from then onwards the …rm will produce only low quality). Suppose that producing high quality maintains a high reputation and failing to ensures a low reputation (as is typically assumed to be the case in the literature on relational contacts or equilibria supported by trigger strategies and as we will assume below).
Then this trade-o¤ can be summarized by the following familiar inequality-the key to our analysis-which ensures that the …rm produces high quality:
short-term cost of producing high rather than low quality discounted value of high reputation -discounted value of low reputation (1) This note essentially aims to point out that increased competition can a¤ect all of these terms and at di¤erent rates, and so the overall e¤ect of competition on such reputation incentives is ambiguous and may be non-monotonic.
Before introducing our example and analyzing it, it is perhaps worth providing some intuition, concerning the "punishment" for not exerting e¤ort-the di¤erence in the discounted values of continuing with a high or low reputation, though note that competition might also a¤ect the left hand side of Inequality (1). On the one hand, if competition drives prices down then, since the …rm can always exit and earn zero pro…ts, it seems clear that competition reduces the discounted value of high reputation with no e¤ect on the discounted value of low reputation (which stays at zero). In this case, competition reduces the punishment for deviating and so makes it more di¢ cult to satisfy Inequality (1) . On the other hand, a …rm in a more competitive environment faces the prospect of a more severe fall in market share as well as a price drop on losing its reputation in the case where the discounted value of low reputation is non-zero and so the punishment for not exerting e¤ort increases with competition, making it easier to satisfy Inequality (1).
Related Literature
A literature beginning with Klein and Le-er (1981) and including, more recently, Hörner (2003) aims at examining the extent to which relational contracts or reputation concerns can ensure high quality provision. As discussed at great length below, our principal point of departure from this tradition is to assume that pro…ts are driven to zero when there are many identical …rms since we do not allow quantities to play a signalling role. Kranton (2003) , perhaps the paper closest to this note in spirit inasmuch as it makes a similar assumption, makes the additional assumption that once a …rm produces low quality, its continuation value is zero and so does not consider or allow for any positive a¤ects of competition on the ability to sustain high quality equilibria-whereas the focus of this note is to highlight that competition has ambiguous e¤ects on such equilibria.
To some extent providing high quality can be thought of as making an investment in reputation and so these results of ambiguous e¤ects of competition on this kind of investment parallel a wide literature on Schumpeterian innovation and discussions on the ambiguous e¤ects of market structure on advertising intensity (see, for example, Sutton (1991) , Cabral (2000) and Martin (1993) ).
With respect to our conclusion on the ambiguous role of competition on quality provision and e¢ ciency, there is a considerable body of literature which, though focusing on di¤erent mechanisms, suggests that economic research is not always in agreement with the conventional wisdom on the bene…ts and e¤ect of competition (for example Schmidt (1997) , Spence (1975) , and Stiglitz (1987) ). Finally, to the extent, that this note suggests that …rms might choose to operate in more competitive environments as a means to commit to "good" behavior both in the present and in the future, it is related to the literature on second-sourcing which considers a …rm's choice to allow for more competition in the future as a means to commit to "good" behavior both in the future (see Farrell and Gallini (1988) and Shepard (1987) and Dudey (1990) and Wernerfelt (1994) in a slightly di¤erent context).
Suppose that there are n + 1 identical …rms. In every period, every …rm simultaneously chooses quantity and quality. When producing low quality, the cost of production is 0, and when producing high quality, the per-unit cost of production is c > 0. Customers cannot observe a product's quality and we do not allow for warranties or other explicit quality-contingent contracts, 1 and so Firm i's demand depends on customers'anticipation of the quality of its product and on those of its rivals. Speci…cally, we suppose that demand is given by the following inverse demand function:
where x it denotes the quantity of the good produced by Firm i in period t and u it 2 fl; hg denotes its anticipated quality, which may be either low or high and denotes the degree of substitution between di¤erent …rms' outputs). In particular, this inverse demand function implies that goods are imperfect substitutes when < 1
and that customers are willing to pay more when they anticipate high quality goods.
We assume that customers'and rivals'expectations of Firm i's quality and future behavior are not a¤ected by its quantity decision. This implies both that x it plays no signalling role and precludes the possibility of collusion between …rms. 3 Firms maximize future pro…ts with a per-period discount factor . Finally, suppose that h(1 c) > l, which is su¢ cient to ensure that high quality provision is e¢ cient and that …rms would choose to produce high quality if it were observable.
We aim to explore how the possibility that an industry can sustain a high quality equilibrium, that is one where each …rm produces high quality, varies with the degree of competition (as measured either by or by n).
Notice that since we assume that expectations of future quality depend only on past quality and not on past or current quantity decisions, if a high quality equilibrium is sustained then it will be one where each …rm sets the quantity that would maximize pro…ts in the case that it was maximizing static pro…ts where it and all other …rms were producing at high quality. We denote this pro…t-maximizing quantity by x h and the associated per-period pro…ts h and price p h .
Suppose that customers and …rms anticipated that Firm i was going to produce high quality and that all other …rms produced high quality and produced x h then Firm i's most pro…table deviation would be to produce low quality output and to change its quantity to x d , where:
and the associated single-period pro…t associated with this behavior is d .
Following Abreu (1988) , to consider the viability of the equilibrium in which all …rms produce high quality, one should consider a most severe feasible punishment continuation equilibrium for a …rm that deviates, suppose that the per-period pro…t that the deviating …rm earns in this most-severe-feasible-punishment equilibrium is msf p then the condition that ensures the existence of an equilibrium in which all …rms produce high quality, analogous to Inequality (1), is given by:
We return to analyze h , d , msf p and how = 
Static benchmark: m …rms low, n + 1 m high
In our simple environment, where no other agents'decisions depend on Firm i's quantity decision, it is enough to consider continuation equilibria where …rms maximize static pro…ts taken as given equilibrium quality decisions.
Consider, therefore the situation where m …rms are producing low quality and n + 1 m …rms are producing high quality. Then let x lm denote a low quality producer's output in this case and x hm a high quality producer's output (and note that x h = x h0 ). Then x lm is given by:
A similar expression will de…ne x hm . These will be useful for determining the pro…ts for a low quality producer lm and for a high quality produce hm when m out of n+1 …rms are producing low output. First order conditions and some algebraic manipulation will reveal that
and
where m = 8 > < > :
It can be shown that both lm and hm are continuous and increasing in m and that hm > lm .
Necessary and su¢ cient conditions for high quality equilibrium
Returning to our central question, the last sentence of the previous subsection implies that the most severe punishment will be the one where in the continuation equilibrium the deviating …rm is supposed to produce at low quality and as many …rms as possible produce high quality. Note, however, that a continuation equilibrium where one …rm produces low quality and the remaining …rms produce high quality may not be feasible. Nevertheless, it is clear that it is always the case that there is a continuation equilibrium where all …rms produce low quality, and associated with this continuation equilibrium we can de…ne:
In addition, following our earlier remarks, associated with the most severe equilibrium (which may not be feasible) we can de…ne:
Finally, it follows that nec suf f and so the …gures below, plotted for speci…c parameter values, as described in the legends, are su¢ cient to substantiate our earlier claim that competition (as measured either by or by n) can have ambiguous and, in particular, non-monotonic e¤ects on the possibility of an equilibrium in which high quality output is produced, as summarized by which represents the trade-o¤ between the short-term gain of deviating from such an hypothetical equilibrium and the long term costs of sticking to it. 
Then using these two equations and Equation (2)-the expression for the inverse demand function-and noting that the pro…t for a low quality producing …rm is lm = p lm x lm and for a high quality producing …rm that hm = (p hm c)x hm then
Equations (6) and (7) result.
Note that 2l + l(n m) h(1 c)(n + 1 m) > 0 is increasing in m since h(1 c) > l and so lm and hm are increasing in m.
Now when all …rms are producing high quality then m = 0 and
From Equation (3), it follows that:
and so
Finally, using this last expression and Equation (7) at m = 0 and Equation (6) at m = 1 and m = n + 1 and noting that n+1 = 1, we can write down suf f and nec in terms of the parameters of the model as follows: 
